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I. INTRODUCTION
EDUCATIONAL malpractice, as a tenable cause of action for neg-
ligence in the educational arena, surfaced in the 1970s as a con-
sensus grew that the nation's public schools were failing in their
mandate to educate our young. Educational malpractice as a tort theory
applied to multiple facets of the educational process; however, two cate-
gories of claims have emerged that focus on the failure of an educator to
perform educational duties adequately. The first category of claims'
comprises a failure to adequately counsel or educate, while the second
category2 focuses upon a failure to provide proper student evaluation and
placement into appropriate educational programs. 3 Judicial reaction to
the emergence of educational malpractice as a theory for recovery has
been overwhelmingly negative 4 and can be summarized as a theory "be-
loved of commentators, but not of courts."'5 This Comment highlights the
theories advanced in support of an educational malpractice cause of ac-
tion and the rationale espoused by the courts in their rejection of the
claim. Further, the Comment briefly highlights sex education and ana-
lyzes whether it is sufficiently distinguishable from classical pedagogical
teaching methods to sustain itself uniquely under an educational malprac-
tice framework.
II. REVIEW OF CLASSICAL EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
Various theories of recovery have been espoused for failure to ade-
quately counsel or educate; they include constitutional, contractual, and
misrepresentation theories as well as the traditional negligence theory.6
1. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992); Peter W. v.
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856 (Ct. App. 1976); Hunter v. Board
of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 583 (Md. 1982); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (N.Y. 1979).
2. See, e.g., B.M. v. State, 649 P.2d 425, 426 (Mont. 1982); Hunter, 439 A.2d at 583.
3. TWo other categories of claims have also arisen. These categories are: (1) failure to
provide proper medical diagnosis and treatment, and (2) failure to warn or protect students
from another student's illness-related dangerous proclivities. Johnny C. Parker, Educa-
tional Malpractice: A Tort is Born, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 301, 303 (1991). These categories
are distinguishable from those discussed in the body of this document; they address pre-
existing medical and psychological facets within education while the two categories focused
upon in this paper address the traditional, educational "classroom" dynamics between edu-
cators and their students.
4. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 414; Peter W., 131 Cal Rptr. at 862; Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at
1354. But see B.M., 649 P.2d at 427.
5. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1327 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 957 F.2d 410 (1992).
6. Frank D. Aquila, Educational Malpractice: A Tort En Ventre, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
323, 327-35 (1991); Karen H. Calavenna, Comment, Educational Practices, 64 U. DET. L.
REv. 717,726-30 (1987); John G. Culhane, Reinvigorating Educational Malpractice Claims:
A Representational Focus, 67 WASH. L. Rv. 349, 355-60 (1992).
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A. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF RECOVERY
The constitutional theory under which plaintiffs have brought educa-
tional malpractice claims is substantive due process. 7 The substantive due
process argument is as follows: students surrender their constitutional lib-
erty interest8 for a minimally adequate education under the principle of
quid pro quo. Plaintiffs in educational malpractice suits aver that due
process requires an involuntarily confined student (through mandatory
attendance laws) to receive a minimally adequate education by analogiz-
ing Donaldson v. O'Conner,9 which held that due process required an
involuntarily confined mental institution patient to receive minimally ad-
equate treatment. 10 The due process theory of recovery has been sub-
stantially debilitated by Youngberg v. Romeo." In Youngberg, a mentally
retarded individual, involuntarily confined to a state institution, sued the
state alleging violation of his constitutional rights, namely the right to
safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily re-
straint, and training within the institution.' 2 The Court recognized the
patient's liberty interest in safe conditions and freedom from unreasona-
ble bodily restraint.' 3 The Court, however, tepidly approached the al-
leged right to a "minimally adequate habilitation," which it defined to
mean minimal "training and development of needed skills.' 4 The Court
cited Harris v. McRae'5 for the proposition that "a State is under no con-
stitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its bor-
der"'16 and even when a duty does exist "a State necessarily has
considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its respon-
sibilities."'1 7 In short, the Supreme Court was reluctant to broadly charac-
terize a right to minimally adequate training as a constitutionally
protected liberty interest.
B. CONTRACTUAL THEORY OF RECOVERY
The contractual theory of recovery has two alternative approaches.
The first approach states that an implied contract exists between a stu-
7. Aquila, supra note 6, at 339-42.
8. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(holding that students have constitutional rights to freedom of speech and a fourteenth
amendment liberty interest in education under the Due Process Clause).
9. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Gumanis v. Don-
aldson, 422 U.S. 1052 (1975).
10. Charles M. Masner, Note, Educational Malpractice and a Right to Education:
Should Compulsory Education Laws Require a Quid Pro Quo?, 21 WASHBURN L. J. 555,
567-71 (1982); see Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353. But see B.M., 649 P.2d at 427.
11. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
12. Id at 315.
13. Id. at 315-16.
14. Id at 316-17 (citation omitted).
15. 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980).




dent and either his teacher or school district.18 The plaintiff alleges the
school promised to provide a minimal level of education either implicitly,
through the goals inherent in the educational process, or expressly,
through statutory or constitutional provisions. In return, the plaintiff al-
leges he promised not to seek private education as consideration. 19 Al-
ternatively, the plaintiff may aver that school attendance constitutes
sufficient consideration. 20
The implied contract approach suffers because of weakness in the con-
sideration doctrine. Without the required element of consideration,
promises between parties are judicially unenforceable. 21 States provide
public education free of cost to each individual student, therefore a stu-
dent has difficulty in establishing consideration in the traditional manner
of a "bargained-for exchange. ' '22 Additionally, because public school at-
tendance is obligatory, a student cannot effectively allege attendance as
consideration because the student is not surrendering a legal right.23 Fur-
ther, the argument that sufficient consideration is established through for-
bearance of private education is also untenable because recognition
would allow recovery only to wealthy individuals who could prove private
education a viable option.24 Allowing recovery for educational malprac-
tice to only a class of wealthy individuals is particularly unpalatable.
The second alternative approach25 in the contractual theory of recov-
ery for educational malpractice focuses on the existence of a contract be-
tween the local taxpayers and the school district with the students as
third-party beneficiaries. 26 This approach to recovery also has weak-
nesses. First, in order for the student to establish status as a third-party
beneficiary, the student must prove an intent to benefit third parties in
the contract between taxpayers and the school district.27 Additionally, if
18. Robert H. Jerry, II, Recovery in Tort for Educational Malpractice: Problems of
Theory and Policy, 29 KAN. L. REv. 195, 197 (1981).
19. Consideration requires three conditions to be met, as defined by Justice Benjamin
Cardozo, then Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals. A promisee must suffer a
legal detriment, the detriment must induce the promise, and the promise must induce the
detriment. Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173, 174
(N.Y. 1927). Black's Law Dictionary defines consideration as "[s]ome right, interest, profit
or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility,
given, suffered, or undertaken by the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (6th ed.
1990).
20. See generally Jerry, supra note 18, at 207.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 cmt. a (1979).
22. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845) (distinguishing a precondition of a gift from a
bargained-for exchange amounting to consideration).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (known commonly as the "pre-ex-
isting duty" rule which states that "[p]erformance of a legal duty owed to a promisor... is
not consideration").
24. Joan Blackburn, Comment, Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 117, 135-36 (1978).
25. Richard Funston, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Search of a The-
ory, 18 SAN DIEoO L. REv. 743, 761-62 (1981).
26. Third party beneficiary principles are outlined in the second Restatement of Con-
tracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 302-15.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1)(b).
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the student effectively establishes third party beneficiary status, the stu-
dent must prove that he or she was the intended beneficiary at the time of
contract formation.28 Lastly, even in the event of establishment of con-
tract and breach, recovery in contract is, at best, meager. The policy goal
in contract remedies is directed toward protecting the plaintiff's expecta-
tion interest.29 This precludes an action based on vicarious liability which
is available only in tort.30
C. MISREPRESENTATION THEORY OF RECOVERY
The misrepresentation theory includes both intentional and negligent
misrepresentation. The elements needed to establish intentional misrep-
resentation are: (1) a false representation of fact; (2) knowledge by the
defendant that the representation is false (scienter); (3) an intention to
induce reliance by the plaintiff upon the misrepresentation; (4) justifiable
reliance by the plaintiff upon the misrepresentation; and (5) damage to
the plaintiff resulting from the reliance. 31 Proving specific intent to
deceive is extremely difficult because an honest belief by an educator that
a representation is accurate negates the cause of action.32 Further, even
if the intent to deceive element is shown, the plaintiff must still prove the
student relied on the representation and the reliance was justifiable under
the circumstances. 33 These elements, based heavily on factual inquiries,
are extremely difficult to establish in circumstances that surround educa-
tional malpractice actions. For example, reliance on a grade report
awarding passing marks in reading is not justifiable when the student can-
not read at home.
The second form of misrepresentation is negligent misrepresentation.
Negligent misrepresentation differs substantially from intentional misrep-
resentation because it lacks an intent requirement. To prove negligent
misrepresentation, a plaintiff need not demonstrate an intent to provide
false or misleading information. Conversely, a representation made with
a good faith belief that it was true may nonetheless constitute a negligent
misrepresentation. 34
The elements required to establish negligent misrepresentation are: (1)
knowledge by the defendant that the plaintiff sought information; (2) in-
tent of the plaintiff to rely on the information; (3) injury to the plaintiff as
28. Funston, supra note 25, at 762.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (defining expectation interest as
"interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would
have been had the contract been performed").
30. Often called "imputed negligence" or "respondeat superior." The theory of vicari-
ous liability allows a plaintiff to sue a first party for the actions of a second party based
upon a unique relationship between the first and second party (such as an employer-em-
ployee relationship). W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 69, at 499 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
31. Id. § 106, at 728.
32. Id
33. Id
34. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1981).
1995]
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a result of the reliance; and (4) a relationship between the parties that
justifies the plaintiff's reliance and the defendant's duty to convey infor-
mation with care.35 Establishment of the first element of negligent mis-
representation is relatively easy. Students attend school for the primary
purpose of seeking knowledge. But for the pursuit of knowledge, educa-
tion would serve no purpose in society. The remaining elements of a
negligent misrepresentation claim, however, are substantially more diffi-
cult to establish.
A school district may assert that reliance does not exist unless patents
had foregone a viable option such as private education or a transfer to
another school. 36 Additionally, school districts may assert that student
performance evaluation does not require special expertise exercised
solely by a teacher; parents can effectively evaluate their children them-
selves. Therefore, reliance upon a teacher's opinion may be
unjustifiable. 37
In Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District,38 one of the lead-
ing cases involving educational malpractice, the California Court of Ap-
peals addressed the remaining negligent misrepresentation elements. The
plaintiff in Peter W, was an eighteen-year-old high school graduate who
brought action against the school district alleging both negligence and
misrepresentation. 39 Under the misrepresentation theory, the plaintiff
averred the school district had "falsely and fraudulently represented to
plaintiff's mother and natural guardian that plaintiff was performing at or
near grade level in basic academic skills such as reading and writing."
40
The plaintiff, however, graduated with a fifth grade level reading ability.
The court, in response, summarily dismissed the negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim for public policy reasons. 41 The difficulty in establishing proxi-
mate cause in an educational context42 and the judicial reluctance to
develop a standard of care for an educator 43 essentially drove the dismis-
sal. Such public policy rationales proffered by the courts virtually elimi-
nate the tort of educational malpractice and will be discussed in greater
detail under the negligence theory of recovery. Negligent misrepresenta-
tion, as a potential cause of action, therefore suffers from the difficulty of
establishing justifiable reliance.
35. Blackburn, supra note 24, at 133; PROSSER, supra note 30, § 107, at 745.
36. Blackburn, supra note 24, at 135-36; PROSSER, supra note 30, § 105, at 728.
37. Blackburn, supra note 24, at 136.
38. 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976).
39. Id at 862.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 860-61.
43. d. at 860.
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D. NEGLIGENCE THEORY OF RECOVERY
Perhaps the most popular theory used in the educational malpractice
arena has been traditional negligence. 44 The elements needed to estab-
lish negligence are: (1) the existence of a legal duty; (2) proximate causa-
tion between a breach of the existing legal duty and the resulting injury;
and (3) compensable injury resulting from breach of the legal duty.45
Plaintiffs have made several attempts to establish a legal duty flowing
from educators to their students.4 6 One attempt asserted that educators
assume a duty of student instruction due to the nature of their employ-
ment.47 A second attempt suggested that a duty of care arises from a
special relationship between educators and their students.48 The third at-
tempt analogized an already recognized duty of reasonable care in in-
structing and supervising students in cases involving physical injury.49 In
Peter W., the court distinguished educational injury from cases involving
physical injury50 and rejected the other two attempts to establish a legal
duty on the basis of public policy considerations.51 The court enunciated
a balancing test for determining establishment of a legal duty. Factors
include: social utility versus the risks involved in the conduct, the class of
people the actor is addressing, the relative ability of parties to bear the
financial burden of injury, the relative ability to adopt practical means of
preventing injury, the prophylactic effect of a rule of liability, and the
moral imperatives judges share with the citizenry.52 In declining to estab-
lish a duty, the court stated that "classroom methodology affords no read-
ily acceptable standards of care" 53 and that "[w]e find in this situation no
conceivable 'workability of a rule of care' against which defendants' al-
leged conduct may be measured. ' 54 Commentators have attempted to
provide a framework for establishing a standard of care for educators. 55
However, no court has embraced these guidelines.
44. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 411 (7th Cir. 1992); Peter W., 131
Cal. Rptr. at 856; Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 583 (Md. 1982); B.M. v. State,
649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352,
1353 (N.Y. 1979); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 319 (N.Y. 1979); Poe v.
Hamilton, 565 N.E.2d 887, 888 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
45. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 30, at 164-65.
46. Aquila, supra note 6, at 332-35.




51. Id. at 859. The process of establishing a standard of care has historically been
driven by public policy. Prosser defined "duty" as the expression of the sum total of policy
considerations that lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection. PROSSER,
supra note 30, § 53, at 358.
52. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
53. Id. at 860.
54. Id. at 861.
55. John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by In-
competent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 735 (1978). Elson advocates Judge
Learned Hand's cost-benefit formula, B<P*L, using the following factors: difficulty in es-
tablishing student's unique needs, ease by which educator could meet the unique needs,
effects of teacher's actions to meet unique needs on ability to meet other responsibilities,
19951
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In yet another attempt to establish a standard of care for educators,
some commentators have advocated use of a professional standard of
care. These commentators analogize to professional standards of care es-
tablished for other professions, such as medicine and law.5 6 Establishing
a professional standard of care for educators would aid the courts by pro-
viding an objective standard to measure educators.5 7 Furthermore, ex-
pert testimony could be utilized to determine whether an educator
fulfilled the minimum standard of care held by those in good standing in
the profession.58 Several factors encourage such an analogy. Educators
are licensed to educate by their respective states,59 and they are excluded
from minimum-wage, maximum-hour labor statutes.60 Further, an educa-
tor's work is intellectual and varied, and performance of the work re-
quires exercise of judgment and discretion. Lastly, an educator is
required to obtain a degree from an institution of higher learning.61
However, in certain respects an educator's job is distinguishable from the
classical professions. Educators do not establish their own hours, they do
not rely on their reputations to attract clients, and their work is not spe-
cialized in one area.62 Most importantly, the advocation of a professional
standard of care for educators has not been recognized by the courts.63
In addition to their unwillingness to establish a legal duty, the courts
have also alluded to an inability to establish proximate cause. In Peter
W.,64 the court stated that there was no "perceptible connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, as alleged, which would
establish a causal link between them within the same meaning. '65 How-
ever, in Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District66 the court
stated, "As for proximate causation, while this element might indeed be
difficult, if not impossible, to prove in view of the many collateral factors
involved in the learning process, it perhaps assumes too much to conclude
availability of specialized referral resources, and magnitude of the consequences to stu-
dents who do not have their unique needs met. Under traditional B<P*L analysis, the
probability of harm and magnitude of loss are weighed together against the burden placed
upon the actor. If the probability of harm and magnitude of loss are greater than the
actor's burden of care, the actor will have an affirmative duty to act, otherwise no duty of
care will be imposed upon the actor.
56. Deborah D. Dye, Education Malpractice: A Cause of Action That Failed to Pass the
Test, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 503-04 (1987/1988).
57. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 32, at 185.
58. Id. at 188.
59. For example, Texas mandates that the State Board of Education prescribe the
classes of teaching certificates to be issued based on education, experience and duties, the
time period for which each certificate is valid, and the requirements for issuance of an
initial certificate. TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 13.032 (Vernon 1991 & Supp. 1994),
60. For example, West Virginia exempts teachers from minimum wage restrictions. W.
VA. CODE § 21-5C-1 (1985); Dye, supra note 56, at 503-04.
61. For example, Texas law requires a bachelor's degree with an academic major in
education for certain teaching positions. TEx. EDtJC. CODE ANN. § 13.036 (Vernon 1991).
62. Dye, supra note 56, at 503-04.
63. Id.
64. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App. 1976).
65. Id. at 861.
66. 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
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that it could never be established." 67 In light of the "but for" test for
proximate cause, 68 the courts find potential alternative causes more palat-
able. For example, in Peter W. the court stated, "[A]chievement of liter-
acy in the schools, or its failure, are influenced by a host of factors outside
the formal teaching process, and beyond the control of its ministers.
They may be physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, environmental;
they may be present, but not perceived, recognized but not identified. 69
Fundamentally, courts struggle with causation when one student gradu-
ates illiterate while the student sitting next to her graduates with a suffi-
cient educational background. Under these circumstances, the courts do
not find comfort in faulting an educator or educational institution. Be-
cause no consensus exists among education professionals whether, or to
what degree, factors present outside the classroom impact the educa-
tional process,70 proximate cause looms as a formidable obstacle to estab-
lishing negligence as a cause of action for educational malpractice.
In the event proximate cause can be established, the issue of contribu-
tory negligence may still bar a plaintiff from recovery.71 Although some
jurisdictions provide a comparative negligence scheme,72 contributory
negligence, under common law, completely bars a plaintiff from
recovery. 73
Finally, in addition to problems with establishing a legal duty and prox-
imate causation, courts have taken issue with the attribution and calcula-
tion of damages for a breach. Although courts have primarily dismissed
educational malpractice claims on other grounds,74 concern over award-
ing money damages for an educational injury has been voiced.75 One
view highlighted by commentators is that a student who failed to achieve
a minimum standard of learning may not have suffered a legally compen-
sable injury76 and that, in that event, no damages should be awarded. 77
67. 1& at 1353-54.
68. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 41, at 266.
69. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
70. Funston, supra note 25, at 785 (citing M. SORGEN ET AL., STATE SCHOOL AND
FAMILY § 11-3 (1973)).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1977) (defining contributory negligence
as "conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should
conform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with
the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm").
72. For example, Texas provides a comparative negligence statute. TEx. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1994). Comparative negligence statutes
allow recovery, although contributorily negligent, if the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff is less than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought.
73. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 65, at 452.
74. Peter W, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861; Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 1979); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 320 (N.Y.
1979).
75. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (defining "injury" to encompass
injury of a legally protected interest as contrasted with "harm," which denotes existence of
a detriment that may or may not be legally protected).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 902 (defining damages as monies
awarded to one injured by the tort of another); Funston, supra note 25, at 782-83.
1995]
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This view is buttressed by the actions of the courts. In Peter W., the court
stated it was uncertain whether the "plaintiff suffered injury within the
meaning of the law of negligence,"78 and in Donohue the lower court
stated that "every individual is born lacking knowledge, education and
experience. '79 Donohue hints at a tort doctrine that "consequential dam-
ages must be established with reasonable certainty, and must not be spec-
ulative." 80 Therefore, tort law does not compensate for loss of an
expectancy interest.81 Damages associated with classical educational mal-
practice are speculative by nature. For example, the lost opportunity
costs due to illiteracy may be negligible if a student graduates literate and
takes a minimum wage job. Yet, if that same student graduates literate
and becomes a physician, the lost opportunity costs may be enormous.
Because of the practical difficulty in adequately measuring opportunity
loss, the law does not allow speculation on what "might have been" in
ascertaining damages under a theory of negligence.
Additionally, some courts have implied that, if an injury is ascertain-
able, a monetary damage award is inappropriate. 82 If a student lacks a
minimal level of knowledge, a monetary award does not address the
problem: the student still lacks an education. Rather, an appropriate so-
lution to the educational damage would be remedial training. Plaintiffs,
however, have not sought equitable damage awards, but rather have
sought relief through monetary means.8 3
Because of the lack of a suitable standard of care, an insufficient nexus
to establish proximate cause, and the inability to identify injury and
therefore quantify damages within a negligence context, the negligence
theory for educational malpractice as a cause of action has been largely
dismissed.
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND THE REFUTATION OF
EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
Although some courts have dismissed educational malpractice claims
by holding that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action,84 the Donohue
court refuted the holding in Peter W. that a plaintiff could never bring a
legitimate cause of action, stating, "It may very well be that even within
the strictures of a traditional negligence or malpractice action, a com-
plaint sounding in 'educational malpractice' may be formally pleaded."85
Instead, the Donohue court broadly dismissed educational malpractice
78. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281).
79. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 880 (App. Div.
1978), aff'd, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
80. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 110, at 767.
81. Funston, supra note 25, at 783.
82. Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982).
83. See, e.g., Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353 (plaintiff seeking monetary damages of
$5,000,000).
84. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Ct. App.
1976).
85. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353.
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claims on public policy grounds, reasoning that " 'educational malprac-
tice' would require the courts not merely to make judgments as to the
validity of broad educational policies[,] a course we have unalteringly es-
chewed in the past but, more importantly, to sit in review of the day-to-
day implementation of these policies."'86 However, the court did reserve
the right, under certain circumstances, to allow claims for educational
malpractice. 87
In Donohue, a high school graduate sued a school district alleging that
the district had failed effectively to evaluate the plaintiff's mental ability
and capacity, and that the district had failed to interview or psychologi-
cally test the plaintiff to ascertain his comprehension ability. The plaintiff
averred that his lack of rudimentary ability disabled him from preparing
employment applications, and therefore caused his employment difficul-
ties. The court dismissed the suit, stating: "The heart of the matter is
whether, assuming that such a cause of action may be stated, the courts
should, as a matter of public policy, entertain such claims. We believe
they should not."88
The court subsequently identified four categories of public policy con-
siderations that, upon a balancing analysis, barred claims for educational
malpractice.8 9 The four public policy considerations are: (1) judicial in-
trusion into the educational process; (2) the social utility of education; (3)
the student-teacher relationship; and (4) the economic and administrative
impact upon schools. 90 Commentary on the application of these public
policy factors to educational malpractice claims has been verbose.91
However, the courts have steadfastly denied plaintiffs relief, citing public
policy concerns. 92
86. Id at 1354.
87. Id. "[T]his is not to say that there may never be gross violations of defined public
policy which the courts would be obliged to recognize and correct." Id (quoting New York
City Sch. Boards Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 568, 574 (N.Y. 1976)).
88. Id. at 1353.
89. Laurie S. Jamieson, Note, Educational Malpractice: A Lesson in Professional Ac-
countability, 32 B.C. L. Rv. 899, 900-03 (1991).
90. Id. at 901.
91. See, e.g., Aquila, supra note 6, at 342-50 (arguing that administrative remedies al-
ready exist for educational injuries); Calavenna, supra note 6, at 731-36 (stating that the
existence of a cause of action will not result in a flood of litigation); Elson, supra note 55, at
647-92 (arguing that courts are unable to review educational malpractice adequately);
Funston, supra note 25, at 791-810 (stating that common law adjudication is an inappropri-
ate vehicle for educational injuries); Jamieson, supra note 89, at 934-42 (stating that judi-
cial review need not be overly intrusive); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for
Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tax. L. REv. 777, 852-60
(1985) (arguing for recognition of a new duty not resulting in money damages, thereby
removing threat of financial impact); Catherine D. McBride, Note, Educational Malprac-
tice: Judicial Recognition of a Limited Duty of Educators Toward Individual Students; A
State Law Cause of Action for Educational Negligence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 475, 487-93
(1990).





As the New York Court of Appeals stated in Hoffman v. Board of Edu-
cation,93 "[o]ur decision in Donohue was grounded upon the principle
that courts ought not interfere with the professional judgment of those
. . . with the responsibility for the administration of [our] schools." 94
Courts have concluded that the courtroom is an inappropriate forum for
evaluation of educational theories and methods.95 For example, the
Hoffman court stated:
In order to affirm a finding of liability in these circumstances, this
court would be required to allow the finder of fact to substitute its
judgment for the professional judgment of the board of education
[sic] .... Such a decision would also allow a court or a jury to sec-
ond-guess the determinations of each of plaintiff's teachers.9 6
Other courts have reiterated this distaste for judicial intrusion into the
educational process.97 Furthermore, the judicial stance of nonintrusion
has been upheld for acts of both misfeasance 98 and nonfeasance. 99
Instead of intruding into the educational process, the courts have as-
serted that more appropriate remedies exist. For example, in Donohue
the court encouraged parents to "take advantage of the administrative
process... [to ensure] students receive a proper education."'u ° The court
in Hunter v. Board of Education'0 ' went even further, listing in detail a
statutory, administrative scheme providing parents recourse for educa-
tional injury. 10 2 The Hunter court concluded that it is "preferable ... to
settle disputes concerning classification and placement of students and
the like by resorting to these and similar informal measures than through
the post hoc remedy of a civil action"'0 3 and that such review "may cor-
rect erroneous action in time so that any educational shortcomings suf-
93. 400 N.E.2d 317 (N.Y. 1979).
94. Id. at 320.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Torres v. Little Flower Children's Serv., 474 N.E.2d 223, 226 (N.Y. 1984), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985) (stating, in denying recovery on public policy grounds, that
"plaintiff's allegations would require the courts to... examine Board of Education policies
and their implementation by school officials-the very role we have already declined to
assume"); Poe v. Hamilton, 565 N.E.2d 887, 889 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (embracing the
Donohue rationale, stating that "the professional judgment of educators in determining
appropriate methods of teaching should not be disturbed").
98. Misfeasance is the improper performance of some act that a person may lawfully
do. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 1000 (6th ed. 1990); see, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855 (Ct. App. 1976) (plaintiff alleged school district
negligently failed to provide adequate instruction).
99. Nonfeasance is the nonperformance of some act which a person is obligated or has
some responsibility to perform. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1054 (6th ed. 1990); see, e.g.,
Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353 (plaintiff alleged school district negligently failed to retest
according to district procedures).
100. 391 N.E.2d at 1355.
101. 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982).




fered by a student may be corrected. Money damages ... are a poor
substitute ... for a proper education.' 10 4
B. ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT UPON SCHOOLS
A second public policy factor considered in educational malpractice
cases has been the potential economic and administrative impact upon
school districts. This factor is two-pronged. In one instance, courts are
concerned schools will be wrongly exposed to feigned claims by disgrun-
tled students and parents. Consider the number of students who, justly or
unjustly, are unhappy with their performance or have personal animosity
toward their teachers. As enunciated in Peter W., holding school districts
liable would "expose them to the tort claims-real or imagined-of disaf-
fected students and parents in countless numbers."'01 5 A second area of
concern, regardless of the validity of claims, is the financial burden such
claims would impose upon the schools. As stated in Ross v. Creighton
University,10 6 "[t]he sheer number of claims that could arise if this cause
of action were allowed might overburden schools."'01 7 In light of the fi-
nancial crisis affecting many school districts10 8 with already bloated staffs
of non-educators, this concern is compelling.
C. SOCIAL UTILITY OF EDUCATION
A third factor in a public policy analysis is the social utility of education
and its value in our society. Our society increasingly acknowledges the
import of a proper education.' °9 The lower court in Hunter v. Board of
Education"° stated:
We are aware that a serious social problem exists when ... [a stu-
dent] has not been taught to read. We are equally cognizant of criti-
cisms of the teaching profession. The situation is even more serious
when one recalls to mind the words of Thomas Jefferson that a na-
tion cannot be ignorant and free .... The seriousness of a matter,
however, does not mean that a solution may be found, or redress
obtained, through the use of the courts."'
104. Id. (quoting D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 557
(Alaska 1981)).
105. Peter W, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
106. 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
107. Id. at 414.
108. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
109. THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION, A REPORT TO THE
NATION AND THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION 8 (1983). The report stated that 23 million
citizens and 13% of the country's seventeen-year-olds are functionally illiterate. In addi-
tion, the report stated that over a typical twelve-year education, American children spend
more than eight thousand fewer hours in school than their Japanese and English counter-
parts. Id. at 21. See also Ron dePaolo, A Nation at Risk-Stil," State of American Educa-
tion, ACRoss THE BOARD, March 1993, at 16. DePaolo discusses the report "A Nation at
Risk" and the nation's lack of success in meeting the report's recommendations. Only
30% of today's students take the core curriculum recommended in the report.
110. 425 A.2d 681 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 439 A.2d 582
(Md. 1982).
111. Id at 684-85 (footnotes omitted).
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Therefore, although courts have acknowledged the social utility of educa-
tion, they have accorded little weight in balancing this factor against
other public policy considerations.
D. STUDENT-TEACHER RELATIONSHIP
The last public policy factor focuses on the nature of the student-
teacher relationship. Because the relationship is one of unequal power,
judicial attention may be appropriate under certain circumstances. 112
Further, in Smith v. Alameda County Social Services Agency, 113 the court
recognized that the state education agency exerts considerable control
over students (minors) who cannot protect themselves. 1 4 Commentators
have noted that increased judicial scrutiny of situations such as these is a
growing trend."l 5
In balancing the reluctance to intrude into the educational arena and
the economic/administrative impact on the schools with the social utility
of education and the student-teacher relationship, the courts have flatly
refused to recognize educational malpractice as a potential cause of
action.
IV. SEX EDUCATION: WHEN, WHAT AND HOW?
It is difficult to ascertain definitively whether sex education programs
in the public schools have been effective. First, since no consensus exists
on the objectives of sex education, consensus on a proper evaluation stan-
dard also does not exist. 1 6 Second, any statistic presents only a single
facet of information. For example, the number of annually reported cases
of gonorrhea provides information on the frequency of transmission as
compared to past years. However, the same statistic does not provide
insight into what would have happened had sex education not been im-
plemented. 117 Finally, as with all statistical data, disagreements exist re-
garding the extent to which correlation accurately reflects a "cause-and-
effect" relationship between the variables.
Regardless of these difficulties, consensus is developing that the sexual
revolution has produced some undesirable consequences." 8 For exam-
112. Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 442 N.Y.S.2d 38, 38-39 (Sup. Ct. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (App. Div. 1982); Pierce v. Board of Educ., 358 N.E.2d 67, 67-
68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 370 N.E.2d 535 (Ill. 1977).
113. 153 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Ct. App. 1979).
114. Id. at 717.
115. Jamieson, supra note 89, at 939.
116. SORGEN ET AL., supra note 70, § 11-3.
117. This analysis is analogous to opportunity cost analysis in economics, accounting
and finance. An opportunity cost is defined as the potential benefit that is lost or sacrificed
when the choice of one course of action requires the giving up of an alternative course of
action. RAY H. GARRISON, MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 43 (3d ed. 1982); J. FRED WES-
TON ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 64 (6th ed. 1982).
118. Wendy Cole et al., How Should We Teach Our Kids About SEX?; Bombarded by
Mixed Messages About Values, Students Are More Sexually Active Than Ever, and More
Confused, TIME, May 24, 1993, at 60 (highlighting the impact of the sexual revolution upon
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pie, unwed pregnancies have risen 87% among teenagers between the
ages of fifteen to nineteen 19 and unwed births among teens have risen
61% since 1970.120 Presently, more than 40% of women in the United
States become pregnant before they reach twenty years of age and more
than one million teenagers become pregnant each year.121 With regard to
sexually transmitted diseases, one million cases of pelvic inflammatory
disease occur annually, 122 and over 500,000 new cases of gonorrhea were
reported in 1992.123 Further, the rate of gonorrhea among teenage fe-
males ages fifteen to nineteen is twenty-two times higher than the rate for
women ages thirty and older.124 Over 100,000 new cases of syphilis were
reported in 1992125 and over one million new genital herpes simplex in-
fections have been reported between 1986 and 1992.126 Further, over
400,000 new cases of chlamydia were also reported. 127 An estimated
16.4% of the United States population now have herpes, 128 and approxi-
mately twenty-four million cases of human papilloma virus exist among
our country's citizens, with a prevalence of the disease among teenag-
ers.129 Additionally, between January 31, 1989 and February 1, 1990, the
number of AIDS cases among teenagers increased by 40%.130 The ques-
tion is: to what extent has sex education in the public schools contributed
to the proliferation of sexually transmitted diseases and the dramatic in-
crease in teenage pregnancies, i.e., children having children?' 31
the parent-child relationship and how the erosion of past sexual norms has left a moral
vacuum resulting in adolescent confusion).
119. JAMES DOBSON, THE NEW DARE TO DISCIPLINE 212 (1992) (citing FAMILY RE-
SEARCH COUNCIL, WASHINGTON WATCH 3, CONDOM ROULETITE 1 (1992)).
120. The Reauthorization of Title X of the Public Health Service Act: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee On Health and the Environment, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2722 (1992) (testi-
mony of Charmaine Yoest, Policy Analyst, Family Research Council) [hereinafter Yoest
Testimony].
121. DOUGLAS KIRBY ET AL., SCHOOL-BASED PROGRAMS TO REDUCE SEXUAL RISK
BEHAVIORS: A REVIEW OF EFFECTIVENESS, PUBLIC HEALTH REPORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, May 1994 [hereinafter EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW].
122. DOBSON, supra note 119, at 209 (citing Interview with Pamela McDonnell, Sexu-
ally Transmitted Diseases Division, Center for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Serv. in Atlanta, Ga. (Mar. 16, 1992)).
123. DIVISION OF STD/HIV PREVENTION, U.S. DEFT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,
PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., ATLANTA, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTIED DISEASE SURVEILLANCE 13
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 STD SURVEILLANCE REPORT].
124. EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW, supra note 121, at 1.
125. 1992 STD SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 123, at 6, fig. 1.
126. Id. at 28, fig. 33.
127. Ild. at 177, tbl. 31.
128. Robert E. Johnson et al., A Seroepidemiologic Survey of the Prevalence of Herpes
Simplex Virus Type 2 Infection in the U.S., 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 7, 8 (1989).
129. Laura A. Koutsky et al., Epidemiology of Genital Human Papillomavirus Infection,
10 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REV. 122, 140 (1988).
130. Denice Cora-Bramble et al., The Sex Education Practicum: Medical Students in the
Elementary School Classroom, 62 J. ScrH. HEALTH 32 (1992).
131. For example, studies have shown a stepped increase in teenage sexual activity and
teenage pregnancy with the increase in sex education programs. From 1971 to 1979, pre-
marital sex among teenage women rose from 30% to 50%. A 1986 Louis Harris Poll com-
missioned by Planned Parenthood found that 64% of 17-year-olds who had contraception
instruction had engaged in intercourse while only 57% of 17-year-olds who did not have
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V. DISTINGUISHING SEX EDUCATION
In contrast to competing pedagogical methods of education, of which
no consensus has emerged as to objective evaluation criteria, 132 the sci-
ences of physiology, human reproduction, and virus and bacteria trans-
mission share broad consensus within the medical and scientific
communities. 133
Sharp disagreement exists regarding when sex education should begin,
what it should entail, and how (or in what forum) it should be dis-
persed. 134 This comment, however, does not address these social and
political issues. Rather, the comment focuses upon the following issues:
given a sex education curriculum, is the curriculum accurate? Do objec-
tive criteria exist to make such a determination? In the event the curricu-
lum is inaccurate, does the inaccuracy create a justifiable reliance in
students? Further, if a student relied upon the inaccuracy to his detri-
ment, does a cause of action sounding in educational malpractice exist?
More specifically, is the rationale espoused in the seminal educational
malpractice cases135 applicable or appropriate in the context of sex edu-
cation malpractice? Lastly, if educational malpractice and sex education
malpractice are distinguishable and actionable, what remedies should be
available?
A. NEGLIGENCE THEORY OF RECOVERY
As stated earlier, the most popular theory of recovery for educational
malpractice claims has been traditional negligence. Again, negligence re-
quires the existence of a legal duty, proximate causation between the de-
fendant's actions and the breach of the existing legal duty, and
compensable injury resulting from the breach of the legal duty.136
1. Existence of a Legal Duty
Remember that three distinct theories were proposed to establish a
legal duty in the educational malpractice context: (1) educators assume a
duty of student instruction by nature of their employment; (2) a duty of
care arises from a special relationship between educators and their stu-
such instruction had engaged in intercourse. Jacqueline R. Kasun, Condom Nation: Gov-
ernment Sex Education Promotes Teen Pregnancy, 69 POLICY REv. 79 (1994).
132. SORGEN ET AL., supra note 70, § 11-3.
133. 2 CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 1566 (James B. Wyngaarden, M.D. et al. eds.,
19th ed. 1992); 1 HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 485 (Kurt J. Isselbacher,
M.D. et al. eds., 13th ed. 1994).
134. Mimi Hall, How Far to Go on Sex Ed, USA TODAY, Oct. 7, 1993, at 6D; Robert
O'Harrow, Jr., Fairfax County Schools Sex Education Program Takes a Conservative Turn,
WASH. POST, July 15, 1994, at C4; Lawsuit Seeks Sex Education Guidelines, MIAMI HER-
ALD, Oct. 14, 1993, at lB.
135. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854 (Ct. App.
1976); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982); Donohue v. Copiague Union
Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317
(N.Y. 1979).
136. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 30, at 164-65.
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dents; and (3) a duty exists analogous to a recognized duty of reasonable
care in instructing and supervising students in cases involving physical
injury.137 The first two theories were dismissed on policy grounds due to
the court's inability to create a workable standard by which to measure a
defendant's conduct. 138 The court in Peter W. focused on the nature of
the educational process in stating that "classroom methodology affords
no readily acceptable standards of care .... The science of pedagogy
itself is fraught with different and conflicting theories."'1 39 Sex education
is distinguishable from the "science of pedagogy"" 4° in that sex education
is not a methodology or theory upon which reasonable persons disagree.
Rather, sex education is fundamentally an impartation of well-defined,
understood information. As such, the impartation of this information is
either factually accurate or not. Further, objective criteria exist to mea-
sure the accuracy of such an impartation. Therefore, since sex education
is not "fraught with different and conflicting theories,"' 4 ' a standard of
care may be established for educators in this context, thereby giving rise
to a legal duty.
The third attempt to establish a legal duty through analogy to a recog-
nized duty of reasonable care in instructing and supervising students in
cases involving physical injury failed because the court distinguished edu-
cational injury from physical injury.' 42 However, in the case of sex edu-
cation, reliance upon inaccurate information may give rise to a physical
injury.143 Therefore, in a sex education context, educational injury may
equal physical injury. A closer analysis of the development of a duty of
reasonable care in instructing and supervising students in cases involving
physical injury provides greater insight into its potential applicability to
educational malpractice in sex education.
In Bellman v. San Francisco High School District,'" a seventeen-year-
old girl was physically injured while participating in a physical education
class. In affirming the decisions of the lower courts, 45 the California
Supreme Court ruled that a standard of care defined by an "ordinary
prudence" standard created a legal duty.' 46 Therefore, a legal duty ex-
137. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857-58.
138. Id. at 861.
139. Id. at 860.
140. Pedagogy is defined as the art, science, or profession of teaching. WEBSTER'S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 844 (1973).
141. Peter W, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
142. Id at 858.
143. Joel B. Korin et al., Civil Liability for the Transmission of AIDS, N. J. LAW., Jan./
Feb. 1989, at 40 (highlighting liability for transmission of sexually transmitted disease based
on theories of negligence, battery, misrepresentation and products liability); Linda K.
Burdt et al., The Real Fatal Attraction: Civil and Criminal Liability for the Sexual Transmis-
sion of AIDS, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 657 (1988) (discussing injury from transmission of AIDS
with physical manifestations of weight loss, persistent fever, lymph node enlargement,
bumps and blotches on the skin, and in some cases forgetfulness, impaired speech and
seizures).
144. 81 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1938).
145. Id. at 896.
146. Id at 897.
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isted for school districts to ensure that "ordinary prudence" be used in
instructing students when physical injury is a potential consequence. The
court ruled that the issue of whether "ordinary prudence" was exercised
is a factual one, resolved by the factfinder: "What is ordinary care de-
pends upon the circumstances of each particular case and is to be deter-
mined as a fact with reference to the situation and knowledge of the
parties."'1 47 This principle was reaffirmed in Dailey v. Los Angeles Uni-
fied School District.148 Although the facts in Dailey concerned negligent
supervision, 149 the court revisited the question of the legal duty of school
districts. The -court stated: "This uniform standard to which they are held
is that degree of care 'which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with
(comparable) duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.' ",150
Additionally, a multitude of jurisdictions have held educators and educa-
tion administrators personally liable for personal injuries of students.' 5 '
In short, the reasoning for denying educational malpractice claims cen-
tered on the inability to create a standard of care in education and the
lack of physical injury. 152 Sex education malpractice can be readily dis-
tinguished from educational malpractice because a workable standard of
care can be developed through objective criteria and because sexual mal-
practice may result in physical injury.
2. Causation
Courts have also asserted that an inability to establish a causal link
between a breach of a duty and a compensable injury prohibits a claim in
educational malpractice. 153 This view has been strongly criticized by
commentators, 54 and perhaps the best view is that taken by the court in
Donohue, which stated that "while [causation] might.., be difficult... to
prove ... it perhaps assumes too much to conclude that it could never be
established."'1 5 However, the Donohue court rejected the claim on lack
147. Id.
148. 470 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1970).
149. Id. at 361 (physical education instructor failed to supervise properly during the
noon lunch hour).
150. Id. at 363 (quoting Prikle v. Oakdale Sch. Dist., 253 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1953)).
151. See generally, Annotation, Personal Liability of Public School Executive or Admin-
istrative Officer in Negligence Action for Personal Injury or Death of Student, 35 A.L.R.4TH
272 (1985 & Supp. 1993); Christopher Bello, Annotation, Personal Liability of Public
School Teacher in Negligence Action for Personal Injury or Death of Student, 34 A.L.R.4m
228 (1984 & Supp. 1993).
152. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
153. Id. at 861.
154. See, e.g., Elson, supra note 55, at 747. Elson states:
[T]he fallacy in the Peter W. court's approach is that, in granting defendant's
motion to dismiss, the court ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff could
under no circumstances prove that defendant's conduct caused his inability
to read beyond a fifth grade level. This is a misreading of the common law
principles of causation in negligence cases.
Id.




of causation on its facts.156 The lack of consensus among education pro-
fessionals was cited as a fundamental stumbling block in establishing the
existence of causation.'5 7 Yet, as stated above in the discussion of a legal
duty, sex education is not fraught with the vagaries of educational theo-
ries. What causes injury in sex education malpractice claims is well estab-
lished.' 5 8 One example is contraction of a sexually transmitted disease.
Therefore, the focus in sex education malpractice claims is whether a suf-
ficient nexus exists between the injury and a breach of a legal duty.
A claim under a theory of educational malpractice arises under a di-
verse set of factual circumstances. Students receive instruction under a
sex education curriculum. They either rely upon their instruction or they
do not. This is an issue for the factfinder to determine. It would certainly
be dubious for a school district to assert that students do not or should
not rely upon an educator's instruction because an underlying goal of the
educational process is for students to rely and act upon the instruction
received in school.
A hypothetical fact pattern perhaps best distinguishes a claim in sex
education malpractice with regard to the issue of proximate cause. A
fourteen-year-old virgin attends sex education classes where various
forms of sexual intercourse are discussed. In the course of instruction,
the teacher states that although abstinence prevents contraction of sexu-
ally transmitted diseases ("STDs"), in reality, teenagers have sex and
should therefore have "safe sex" with a condom. No discussion ensues on
exactly what is "safe sex." The child obtains a free condom through a
school condom provision program, uses it with a partner, and contracts an
STD. Under traditional "but for" analysis, a factfinder may, under cer-
tain circumstances, find that "but for" the sex education instruction re-
garding intercourse, "safe sex," and the provision of free condoms, the
child would not have participated in a sexual act and therefore would not
have contracted the sexually transmitted disease. Certainly, the circum-
stances surrounding sex education malpractice are substantially distin-
guishable from the facts surrounding traditional educational malpractice
claims. Therefore, the issue of proximate cause may rightly be deter-
mined by the factfinder.
A development in the theory of proximate causation also fundamen-
tally changes the proximate-cause analysis used in Peter W. and Donohue.
In Mitchell v. Gonzales 59 the California Supreme Court adopted a "sub-
stantial factor" test for establishing proximate causation in negligence ac-
156. Id.
157. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
158. CECIL TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE, supra note 133, at 1566; HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, supra note 133, at 485; SEXUALLY RELATED INFEcTious Dis-
EASES: CLINICAL AND LABORATORY ASPECTS (Tsieh Sun, M.D. ed., 1986) (discussing vari-
ous sexually transmitted diseases and highlighting causes of both bacterial (i.e. gonorrhea,
chlamydia) and viral (i.e. herpes, HIV) infections and present stages of research in
preventing each infection).
159. 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991).
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tions.160 This "substantial factor" test replaced the previous, traditional
"but for" analysis and finds support in Section 431 of the Restatement.' 61
The "substantial factor" test not only "subsumes the 'but for' test"'162 but
extends to factual circumstances where a similar, but not identical, result
would have occurred without the defendant's actions. 163 The new test
also extends to instances where a defendant has made a clearly proven,
but insignificant contribution to the resulting injury. 164
Some commentators have suggested that under a "substantial factor"
test for causation even traditional educational malpractice claims may
survive.' 65 Certainly, the adoption of the "substantial factor" test, argua-
bly a substantially more lenient standard than the traditional "but for"
test, would provide relief even under circumstances where school districts
assert that a student would have certainly contracted a sexually transmit-
ted disease, or become pregnant, without their "safe sex" instruction.
This broad view, embraced by both the Restatement and the California
Supreme Court, may indeed ensure establishment of adequate proximate
causation, especially in light of the fact pattern illustrated above where,
arguably, proximate cause may be established under traditional "but for"
causation analysis.
A second issue with respect to proximate causation is contributory neg-
ligence. Undoubtedly, the issue of whether a student's actions in con-
tracting a sexually transmitted disease or becoming pregnant constitutes
contributory negligence is highly relevant. Generally, contributory negli-
gence addresses a plaintiff's actions that fall below a standard of care.' 66
However, the standard of care is a reasonable person standard, which has
a "sliding scale" for both gravity of consequences and age and maturity of
the actor.' 67 This standard is succinctly highlighted by the court's state-
ment in Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School District:168 "Nevertheless,
adolescent high school students (in present sex education, this includes
elementary and junior high students) are not adults and should not be
expected to exhibit that degree of discretion, judgment, and concern for
the safety of themselves and others which we associate with full matur-
ity.' 69 The court added: "We should not close our eyes to the fact that
.. boys of seventeen and eighteen years of age, particularly in groups
where the herd instinct and competitive spirit tend naturally to relax vigi-
160. Id. at 878-79.
161. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977).
162. Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 878.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Albert C. Jurenas, Will Educational Malpractice Be Revived?, 74 ED. LAW REP. 449
(1992).
166. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 65, at 451.
167. Id. § 53, at 356-59.
168. 470 P.2d 360 (Cal. 1970).
169. Id at 364.
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lance, are not accustomed to exercise the same amount of care for their
own safety as persons of more mature years."'1 70
In addition, the fact that a student has contracted a sexually transmit-
ted disease or become pregnant does not necessarily establish contribu-
tory negligence. For example, condoms may break in circumstances
absent negligence. 171 Even if a school district could prove that a student
did not follow instructions sufficiently, the California Supreme Court
ruled in Bellman v. San Francisco High School District172 that, "while the
evidence shows that the respondent received injury because she did not
do the exercise correctly, this does not necessarily convict her of contrib-
utory negligence, nor absolve the school district from liability."' 73
Clearly, contributory negligence does not act as an absolute bar to recov-
ery, especially in light of that fact that many states have enacted compara-
tive negligence statutes.174
a. Strict Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities
Yet another issue involving the concept of proximate cause and con-
tributory negligence is strict liability for ultrahazardous (or inherently
dangerous) activities. 75 The central issue is: Can sex or sex education
today be categorized as an inherently dangerous activity? If so, what im-
pact does it have upon liability in the context of sex education
malpractice?
The theory of strict liability in tort for ultrahazardous activities is ap-
proximately 130 years old, and was birthed in English common law.176 It
revolves around the core question whether, in situations where no physi-
cal trespass exists, one can be held strictly liable. 77 The original doctrine,
which held that one is prima facie answerable for all damage occurring as
a natural consequence of one's actions, was confined to activities that
were extraordinary or abnormal. 78 In America, strict liability for ul-
trahazardous activities evolved as well.179 The First Restatement of Torts
defined an "ultrahazardous activity" as one which involves a risk of seri-
170. Id
171. See DOBSON, supra note 119, at 210 (stating that condoms have an annual failure
rate of 15.7% in preventing pregnancy).
172. 81 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1938).
173. 1d at 897.
174. See, e.g., Texas Comparative Negligence Statute, TEx. COv. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 33.001 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1994).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519. According to subsection (1) of Section
519, "[olne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm
to the person... resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to
prevent the harm." Id. § 519(1).
176. Fletcher v. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1
Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); PROSSER, supra note 30,
§ 78 at 545.
177. Strict liability is imposed upon an actor absent either an intent to interfere with a
legally protected interest or a breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care. Strict liability is
often referred to as liability without fault. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 75, at 534.
178. See Fletcher, L.R. 1 Ex. at 279-80; Barker v. Herbert, 2 K.B. 633, 645 (1911).
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977).
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ous harm to a person that cannot be eliminated by the exercise of utmost
care and that is not a matter of common usage. 180
The Second Restatement of Torts supplanted the first Restatement's
definition of ultrahazardous activity with six factors: (1) existence of a
high degree of harm; (2) likelihood that the resulting harm is great; (3)
inability to eliminate risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (4) extent to
which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (5) inappropriateness
of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (6) extent to which
its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 181
No one factor is considered determinative; rather, each factor should be
weighed in determining whether strict liability should be applied. 182
Therefore, although the first Restatement may not have considered sex
education an ultrahazardous activity due to its prevalence in educational
curricula ("common usage"), the second Restatement only looks to com-
mon usage as one factor in considering the applicability of strict liability.
For example, in an analogous context, the California Supreme Court in
Bellman v. San Francisco High School District,183 did not find common
usage determinative in holding that gymnastics can be considered ul-
trahazardous for purposes of strict liability: "In deciding whether the em-
ployees of the appellant used ordinary care it was proper for the jury to
consider not only whether the exercise was inherently dangerous but also
whether they should have allowed or required the respondent to take
instruction in tumbling."'1
Certainly the transmission of HIV or another sexually transmitted dis-
ease poses a great harm to a child. Further, evidence provided earlier on
effectiveness of condoms 85 demonstrates the inability to eliminate risk
by the exercise of reasonable care. 186 The remaining factors may come
under close scrutiny and will be hotly contested.
The existence of a high degree of risk and the factors that constitute
such high risk vary greatly. For example, a one percent chance of failure
in the aviation industry is considered a high degree of risk. In practice,
this factor is measured on a sliding scale that inversely tracks the degree
of harm. For harm that is not serious, a large degree of risk will be re-
quired to classify an activity as ultrahazadous. For harms that are serious
(i.e., those resulting in death), in contrast, a low degree of risk is suffi-
180. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1934).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, cmts. e & f.
182. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 78, at 555.
183. 81 P.2d 894 (Cal. 1938).
184. Id. at 897.
185. The FDA requires that condom manufacturers list both the ideal and use effective-
ness rates of their products. Studies show that ideal effectiveness rates vary from 97% to
98.5% and use effectiveness rates vary between 64% to 97%. Therefore, even under ideal
circumstances, condoms have greater than a 1% chance of failure. Nancy E. Dirubbo, The
Condom Barrier, 1987 AM. J. NURSINo 1306, 1309.
186. For example, the graphic condom demonstrations given in sex education classes to
teach students how to use condoms are not sufficient to eliminate the risk of transmission
of an STD. DOBSON, supra note 119, at 212.
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cient. The risk associated with condom effectiveness is well known, 187
and since infection results in serious physical injury and possibly death,
this factor may push the decisionmaker to categorize sex education as an
ultrahazardous activity.
The last two Restatement factors are strong functions of public policy.
Whether sex education instruction is an appropriate activity in public
school classrooms is a challenging question, one this comment does not
seek to answer. The extent to which the value of sex education to the
community outweighs its dangerous attributes is another issue that is at
the core of today's sex education debate. This factor boils down to the
following questions: Does sex education instruction work? If so, are the
casualties of sex education low enough to justify its continuance? Fur-
ther, are the casualties barred from recovery? 188
These factors are currently fiercely debated. Most importantly, schol-
ars are posing these questions and collecting data in an effort to aid in a
reexamination of sex education. Due to uncertainty regarding how courts
will consider these factors, however, it is speculative, at best, whether
strict liability in tort for ultrahazardous activities may effectively be ap-
plied as a theory for sex education malpractice.
b. Strict Liability in Warranty
Yet another issue involving the concept of proximate cause and con-
tributory negligence is strict liability in warranty under the products lia-
bility doctrine. Although this theory was initially confined to sellers who
provided products for human consumption without privity of contract, 189
the theory expanded beyond products for human consumption (i.e., food
and drink) to products for intimate bodily use. 19° The theory then ex-
ploded in applicability in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. ' 91 when
the New Jersey Supreme Court held not only the manufacturer, but also
the automobile dealer, liable under the implied warranty doctrine. 92
Under this theory, an assertion by a sex education instructor that sex
with a condom is "safe sex" may place the instructor in the shoes of Hen-
ningsen's automobile dealer. Although the instructor did not participate
in the manufacture of the condoms, the instructor did make statements
187. Dirubbo, supra note 185, at 1309.
188. These questions track some of the same legal policy questions that were faced
during the industrial revolution. For example, regarding railroads, could the hazards im-
plicit in the industry be overlooked because of the common good provided by the industry?
A second example may be use of chemical agents by the United States government during
the Vietnam War. Was the compelling objective of quickly defeating the North
Vietnamese forces in order to prevent future destruction of property and human life suffi-
cient to bar veterans, who suffered harm from such action, from recovery?
189. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913).
190. Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 269 P.2d 413 (Kan. 1954) (stating that a complaint
against a distributor of hair products for an alleged breach of implied warranty was a suffi-
cient cause of action).
191. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
192. Id. at 96-97.
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that amount to an implied warranty that the product was safe for a partic-
ular use. This theory is fraught with numerous weaknesses,193 yet courts
have consistently shown remarkable creativity' 94 in analogizing existing
legal doctrines to address what the courts perceive as otherwise un-
redressable wrongs.
3. Injury
The third element required under the negligence theory of recovery is
existence of a compensable injury resulting from breach of a legal duty.
Injury associated with sex education malpractice may vary widely de-
pending upon what, in fact, occurs. A first array of damages occurs if
pregnancy results; a second array of damages is incurred if a sexually
transmitted disease is conveyed. A combination of such damages may be
recovered in the event of both pregnancy and conveyance of a sexually
transmitted disease.
In cases where unwanted pregnancies occur, actions are separated into
three categories: 195 wrongful conception,' 96 wrongful birth,197 and wrong-
ful life. 198 In cases of wrongful conception, in addition to recovery of all
medical costs associated with the pregnancy and of birth and post-birth
expenses, courts have ruled that parents may recover damages for mental
anguish and emotional distress.199 In cases of wrongful birth, courts have
invoked public policy to justify a refusal to act boldly in the absence of
precedent. Reluctant to encourage abortion, courts have allowed recov-
ery for parents' mental and emotional distress.200
193. For example, the public school classroom is not a commercial establishment and
the instructor is not expressly selling a product. Certainly the instructor's compensation is
not a direct function of a student's reliance.
194. Whether judicial creativity is socially constructive is another issue this comment
does not seek to address.
195. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Recoverability of Compensatory Damages for
Mental Anguish or Emotional Distress for Tortiously Causing Another's Birth, 74
A.L.R.4TH 798, 804 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
196. Wrongful conception is an action brought by parents of a child for negligence lead-
ing to conception. Id.
197. Wrongful birth is an action brought by parents of a child for negligence leading to
birth with genetic defects or other abnormalities. Id
198. Wrongful life is an action brought by parents of a child on behalf of the child for
negligence leading to the child's impaired life. Id
199. See, e.g., Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982) (stating that compensa-
tory damages are not limited to medical expenses, but include physical pain and suffering
and mental anguish resulting from a physician's negligence in removing the patient's Fallo-
pian tubes); Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738 (Tenn. 1987) (ruling that damages for emo-
tional distress or mental anguish are recoverable only for the period of time extending
from discovery of the pregnancy due to the physician's negligence in a failed tubal ligation
until termination of pregnancy). But see Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986)
(holding that damages due to pain and suffering, loss of earnings, and loss of consortium
are not recoverable for a failed tubal ligation).
200. See, e.g., Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982) (holding that a refusal to
allow recovery for emotional distress, although not directly resulting from tortious con-
duct, would pervert principles of justice). The cases dealing with wrongful birth, however,
have been directed primarily toward a physician's failure to advise of appropriate testing
during pregnancy. These cases were not functions of sexually transmitted disease infection.
[Vol. 49
SEX EDUCATION MALPRACTICE
In cases of wrongful life, where a child suffering from a genetic or other
defect sues for damages, courts have held that the child cannot recover
damages for emotional distress because of the difficulty in measuring the
damage in light of the initially impaired existence. 201
Although emotional distress damages are recoverable, courts have
overwhelmingly rejected attempts by parents to recover child-rearing
costs. 20 2 A vast majority of courts have rejected the "benefits rule" which
advocates full recovery203 and have instead embraced the "limited dam-
ages rule" which prohibits recovery of child-rearing Costs.2° 4 Using pub-
lic policy, these courts have argued that children should not be treated as
property and that costs of child-rearing are speculative in nature.205
Note that courts have held that both parents may recover emotional
distress damages resulting from pregnancy caused by negligence. There-
fore, both the male and female student would have a legally compensable
injury within a sex education malpractice context in cases involving
pregnancy.
The contraction of a sexually transmitted disease results in damages
due to medical expenses incurred in treatment of the disease. Damages
associated with emotional distress and mental anguish may also be recov-
ered.206 Compensatory damages for emotional distress and mental
anguish have also been awarded to plaintiffs solely as compensation for
the fear of contracting a venereal disease.20 7 These damage awards have
also included monies for pain and suffering. 20 8 In the highly publicized
201. See Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984) (holding that the child's distress
and suffering were incognizable).
202. Johnson v. University Hosp., 540 N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1989) (holding that parents
may not recover costs of child-rearing due to the physician's negligence in improperly per-
forming a sterilization procedure). But see Marciniak v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wis.
1990) (rejecting the limited recovery rule and stating that juries routinely make more com-
plex damage assessments and that, therefore, child-rearing costs are not too speculative).
See Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Recoverability of Cost of Raising Normal, Healthy
Child Born as a Result of Physician's Negligence or Breach of Contract or Warranty, 89
A.L.R.4 632, 650-51 (1989 & Supp. 1994).
203. Donaldson, supra note 202, at 645.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 649.
206. See Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 621 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a patient
may recover damages for emotional distress from a physician who operated upon the
plaintiff while infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) without giving notice
to the plaintiff). But see Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (holding a wife
could not recover damages for emotional distress from her husband for conveyance of HIV
in a fact-specific ruling).
207. Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ
ref'd) (holding that emotional distress damages are not recoverable). But see iWyman v.
'T*yman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (overruling Chiles and allowing emotional distress
damages); see also Gary Taylor, Divorcing Wife Gets $500,O00 for Distress, NAT'L L.J., Jan.
25, 1988, at 3 (wife provided expert testimony as evidence of traumatic stress syndrome
and pain and suffering due to husband who paid women for sexual favors).
The cases to date have focused solely on transmission of the HIV virus. Because HIV is
a precursor to AIDS, which is fatal, it is possible that such damage awards may be limited
to potential HIV transmission and would not extend to fear of contraction of other sexu-
ally transmitted diseases.
208. 7Wyman, 855 S.W.2d at 619; Taylor, supra note 207, at 3.
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case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sheft,209 Rock Hudson's lover
sued Hudson's estate for emotional distress and mental anguish due to
potential conveyance of HIV.210 The plaintiff had met Hudson in 1982
and had a sexual relationship with the actor until 1985. In 1984, Hudson
was diagnosed with AIDS and the plaintiff was not given notice. A jury
awarded the plaintiff $14.5 million in compensatory damages, 21' which
included monies for emotional distress and mental anguish even though,
at the time of the verdict, no evidence existed that the plaintiff had con-
tracted the AIDS virus.212
Therefore, injury may be shown without proof of conveyance of a sexu-
ally transmitted disease.213 Undoubtedly, legally compensable injury ex-
ists for which courts have allowed recovery in the case of both unwanted
pregnancy and transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. Further,
some courts have recognized legally compensable injury resulting simply
from exposure to AIDS without any proof of conveyance. This again il-
lustrates the substantial distinguishing characteristics of a cause of action
sounding in sex education malpractice, in contrast with traditional educa-
tion malpractice actions.
B. PUBLIC POLICY REVISITED
The three elements required for the establishment of a negligence
claim may arguably be met in the context of sex education malpractice. In
Donohue, however, the court conceded that, although an educational
malpractice cause of action may be stated, public policy considerations
prohibit such a cause of action from proceeding.214 The public policy
considerations coalesced into four categories: (1) judicial intrusion in the
educational process; (2) the social utility of education; (3) the student-
teacher relationship; and (4) economic and administrative cost
considerations. 215
1. Judicial Intrusion
As stated in Hoffman,216 courts rebuffed educational malpractice
claims, reasoning that the courtroom was an inappropriate forum for the
evaluation of educational theories and methods.217 Further, courts have
commented that remedies outside judicial remedies were more fitting for
209. 989 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1993).
210. Id. at 1106. According to testimony in the case, "[s]everal seconds after [the an-
nouncement that Rock Hudson had AIDS], Christian blacked out from fear. He also lost
sleep, had nightmares, sweated excessively, lost weight, became anxious and short tem-
pered, and occasionally vomited .... M
211. Id.
212. Id at 1109.
213. Again, this may be limited to exposure to the AIDS virus, HIV.
214. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353-54 (N.Y.
1979).
215. Id. at 1354; Jamieson, supra note 89, at 900-03.




"educational injuries. '218 Such reasoning appears to be readily distin-
guishable in the sex education context. Evaluation of sex education cur-
ricula need not focus upon educational theories or methods, but rather
may focus upon technical accuracy.219 Additionally, such evaluation may
be achieved with technical experts, focusing upon objective criteria. Fur-
ther still, it appears that a legal duty in the sex education context can
clearly be established. If a breach of a legally recognizable duty resulting
in a legally compensable injury does indeed exist, the courtroom is the
appropriate forum for redress, for a primary function of the legal system
is to address such wrongs.220
With respect to propriety of the remedy, sex education malpractice is
further distinguishable from classical educational malpractice actions in
that the former results in physical injury as opposed to an amorphous
educational injury. For example, a correction of a school district's erro-
neous sex education practice will not address a plaintiff's injury. The in-
jury associated with sex education malpractice closely mirrors that of
classical medical malpractice which appropriates financial remedies for its
victims. Therefore, under both prongs of analysis which courts have pur-
sued in rebuffing claims in classical educational malpractice, judicial in-
trusion is not a concern in the context of sex education malpractice
because of the action's distinguishing characteristics.
2. Social Utility of Education
Public policy considerations involving the social utility of education
have not been addressed in detail by the courts. Although courts have
noted the integral nature of education and freedom in a democratic re-
public,221 they have been reticent to tap its import as a mandate for judi-
cial activism. However, sex education again appears to distinguish itself
uniquely from classical pedagogy since its application and manner of dis-
semination is accorded substantial freedom.222 Its impact on societal wel-
fare, furthermore, is greater simply because physical injury (i.e.,
218. Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1355.
219. Certainly, absence of technical accuracy would not be rebuffed as merely a diverse
educational method. Such evaluation would be appropriate both for written materials and
the instructor's delivery of the material.
220. PROSSER, supra note 30, § 1, at 3.
221. See Hunter v. Board of Educ., 425 A.2d 681, 684-85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982).
222. Although the Sex Information and Education Council of the United States
("SIECUS") provides guidelines for sex education, entitled Guidelines for Comprehensive
Sexuality Education, each school district is free to determine individually what form of sex
education curriculum is appropriate. O'Harrow, supra note 134, at C4.
Presently, sex education curricula are extremely diverse. Curricula such as "Teen-Aid"
and "Sex Respect" are "conservative" and focus primarily on abstinence as a means of
avoiding pregnancy and contraction of sexually transmitted disease. DOBSON, supra note
119, at 213. Curricula such as "Learning About Sex: The Contemporary Guide for Young
Adults" and "Changing Bodies, Changing Lives" are substantially more progressive and
focus upon practicing "safe-sex" to avoid pregnancy and disease. Dana Mack, What the
Sex Educators Teach, COMMENTARY, N. Y. 1993, at 33.
1995]
SMU LAW REVIEW
pregnancy or STD contraction) is more tangible than educational injury
and its cost (in dollars) is more readily cognizable.
A review of statistics illustrating the pervasiveness of sexually transmit-
ted diseases among this country's citizens will catch the attention of the
courts.223 The direction in which such information will drive the courts,
however, is difficult to predict. Such statistics may result in one of two
divergent responses.
One potential scenario results in the court analyzing the data, pro-
claiming a crisis among our young, and subsequently shielding instructors,
curriculum developers, school districts, and others from liability to
thereby provide maximum flexibility in addressing the crisis. Such action
would necessarily flow from a court that envisions the public school sys-
tem as an institution responsible for the sexual well-being of the adoles-
cent population within our society. Although the judiciary has
historically been slow to wrench such responsibilities from families that
have traditionally dealt with such issues, it is not inconceivable to imagine
that courts will envision a larger role for schools with regard to the sexu-
ality of our adolescents. 224
A second avenue the court may take results in the court analyzing the
data, proclaiming a crisis among our young, and subsequently ensuring
accurate dissemination of sex education information to vulnerable minors
in order to address the crisis. Such action would most likely flow from a
court that perceives a more limited role for public institutions within the
private lives of its citizens. A court that views an expansion of govern-
ment functions pessimistically might question why public schools are ad-
dressing sex education and may require that, if a public school does
provide sex education, 225 the curriculum and its dissemination must be
technically accurate. This could be easily accomplished without substan-
tial judicial activism by simply analogizing sex education malpractice to
established medical malpractice law.
Therefore, it is uncertain how the social utility factor of public policy
will impact a court's analysis of whether a cause of action may exist
sounding in sex education malpractice.
223. For example, unwanted pregnancies are up 87% and unwed births up 61% among
teenage girls, DOBSON, supra note 119, at 212; 500,000 new cases of gonorrhea were re-
ported in 1992, 1992 STD SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 123, at 13; and over
1,000,000 new herpes infections have occurred since 1986. Approximately 16.4% of the
U.S. population has herpes, which is presently incurable. Johnson et al., supra note 128, at
7.
224. Courts have been moot with respect to the broadening of functions in the public
schools such as hot lunch programs, student counseling, post-school day care, etc. Perhaps
the best example is the court's allowance of attempts by school districts to provide free
condoms to students for the goal of preventing the further spread of sexually transmitted
diseases. See, e.g., Alfonso v. Fernandez, 584 N.Y.S.2d 406, 413 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
225. Presently, private schools are not required to provide sex education instruction.
Although no data was found comparing public and private schools, it may be interesting to
note the rate of conveyance of sexually transmitted diseases among students not presently
receiving sex education instruction, and to compare those findings against findings for chil-




Educational malpractice cases have paid lip service to the student-
teacher policy consideration; no court, however, has discussed this issue
rigorously. In Smith v. Alameda County Social Services Agency,226 the
court stated that increased judicial attention to state agency actions is a
healthy means to "safeguard against arbitrary actions that endanger the
best interests of the child. ' 227 Although it granted no relief, the court
implicitly focused upon the alleged injury (namely that prospective par-
ents were discouraged from adopting the plaintiff) and its amorphous,
nonphysical nature. The court further buttressed this implication by anal-
ogizing to Peter W. and distinguishing Elton v. County of Orange,228 stat-
ing that Alameda did not deal with regulations designed to protect the
health and safety of children.229 An implication therefore exists that in-
creased judicial scrutiny may be warranted in situations revolving around
the health and safety of minors. This further serves to distinguish be-
tween classical educational malpractice claims and claims of sex educa-
tion malpractice due to the unique physical nature of the sex education
malpractice injury.
From a practical standpoint, the fact that society wants to encourage
students' reliance upon a teacher's instructions, and given the gravity of
the consequences of student reliance upon inaccurate information, it is
logical to require accuracy in the dissemination of sex education informa-
tion. If instructors are not required to be accurate in both their curricula
and their methods of impartation, how can student reliance be achieved
in parallel, academic areas? This policy further supports recognition of
sex education malpractice as a cause of action.
Therefore the student-teacher policy consideration should not provide
a substantial limitation, but rather support a recognition of sex education
malpractice as a cause of action.
4. Economic and Administrative Impact Upon Schools
To reiterate, the economic and administrative policy factor in classical
educational malpractice is two-pronged: courts are concerned with
feigned claims by disaffected students or parents230 and with the financial
burden that these claims, whether real or bogus, would have upon finan-
cially strapped school districts.231
The first concern with feigned claims is a strong function of the proxi-
mate cause weakness and the vagueness associated with educational in-
jury that are inherent in educational malpractice claims. Because
226. 153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 716-19 (Ct. App. 1979).
227. Id at 717.
228. 84 Cal. Rptr. 27 (Ct. App. 1970) (holding that state officials had a duty to protect
children placed in foster homes).
229. Alameda, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
230. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Ct. App.
1976).
231. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 1992).
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causation in classical educational malpractice is intangible, and because
experts do not agree on the efficacy of competing pedagogical meth-
ods, 232 such a concern appears valid. Again, however, a claim in sex edu-
cation malpractice is distinguishable from classical educational
malpractice because the causation element in a claim for sex education
malpractice focuses upon the nexus between injury and a breach in duty
after a breach of a legal duty and a legally compensable injury have been
established. The identification of injury in sex education malpractice
claims may be precisely determined. In addition, the establishment of a
breach of a legal duty may be based upon an analysis of objective criteria.
These requirements serve as an effective "filter" to remove baseless
claims. Therefore the first prong analysis of the policy is not a concern
and is inapplicable.
The second concern with the financial burden that such an action may
place upon schools has been criticized by commentators. As one com-
mentator states,
the fact that some teachers [or school districts] may be forced to de-
fend themselves in court against unjustified educational claims of
students does not, in itself, warrant denying access to the courts for
all students with educational grievances against their teachers or
school administrators. Principles of fairness, equality, and individual
justice basic to the common law would be undermined if the interest
of a class of potential defendants in avoiding the inconvenience of
the judicial process were given priority over the interest of a class of
potential plaintiffs in securing a judicial hearing for their otherwise
valid claims for relief.233
Although not explicit, the concern with finances appears to be a strong
function of whether a valid injury exists. This may explain why a court
may readily accept hearing a case that involves such complexities as med-
ical malpractice. It may also serve to distinguish sex education malprac-
tice because a tangible, legally compensable injury exists. Sheltering a
school district from liability if, in fact, the district caused such an injury
would be nothing short of a miscarriage of justice. 234
The public policy factors that were accorded substantial authority in
preventing a claim in traditional educational malpractice are not compel-
ling due to the distinguishing nature of a claim sounding in sex education
malpractice. The possibility of establishing a standard of care and the
existence of a tangible, physical injury make impotent the assertions that
such public policy considerations preclude recovery.
232. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61; M. SORGEN ET AL., supra note 70, § 11-3.
233. Elson, supra note 55, at 653-54.
234. Although not a rigorous legal analysis, one may also accord great weight to a sym-
pathetic fact pattern. A young child, beleaguered with a potentially terminal disease due
to reliance upon a school district's instruction, may have a substantially greater chance of
maintaining a claim for recovery than another attempting recovery within traditional edu-
cational malpractice.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Educational malpractice was an attempt to address a perceived crisis
among our young. Courts were not prepared to find a legal duty flowing
from educators to their students, were unconvinced that causation could
be established, and were unpersuaded that a compensable educational
injury existed.235 In addition, to drive the proverbial "stake in the heart,"
courts reasoned that, even if a cause of action could be established, no
recovery would be provided based upon a plethora of public policy
considerations.236
Sex education was birthed in the public schools long before the sexual
revolution. However, its rapid expansion into comprehensive sexuality
programs did not occur until the sexual revolution of the 1960s. Such
growth into areas traditionally relegated to American families has been a
source of bitter dispute. The social and political implications of such ac-
tions are still reverberating as "family values,". "moral drift," and other
buzzwords, while used to castigate leaders advocating such concepts only
a few years ago, are presently being embraced by our political leaders.237
Although many have focused upon whether sex education ought to be
provided, what sex education ought to entail, and when sex education
ought to begin, little attention has been given to addressing, from a legal
standpoint, the casualties of reliance upon inaccurate sex education cur-
ricula. With the rage of "safe sex" campaigns 238 that are not, in fact,
safe, 239 it is not difficult to argue that our nation's adolescent population
has been lulled into a false sense of security. Such misguided reliance has
235. Peter W., 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
236. Id. at 859; Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354
(N.Y. 1979).
237. Janet Singleton, Out-of-Wedlock Birth is No Valid Indicator, USA TODAY, Sept.
23, 1992, at 11A (stating, "we've had one of the worst race riots in history, and the econ-
omy is doing a flaming kamikaze. We need a distraction. Let's start talking about people's
mamas. That's where Quayle came in. Who better to lead a sideshow than a clown?");
Conservatives, Liberals Focus on Declining Values, STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, Sept. 14,
1994, at 6. The latter article states:
In 1992, when Dan Quayle decried TV character Murphy Brown's trendy
decision to have a child without bothering to have a husband, he was ridi-
culed for bashing single mothers .... In 1994, the very same theme-the
alarming rise in fatherless children, the importance of intact families, the
need for personal responsibility-has become a powerful message of Bill
Clinton.
Id.
238. Mimi Hall, Condoms, Schools: A Civics Lesson; Battle Rages Over Safe Sex vs.
Abstinence, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 1991, at 3A (highlighting arguments for "safe sex"
messages). "Dan Quayle keeps saying, 'Abstinence, abstinence'.... says Ali Zarrinnam,
17, a Los Angeles high school senior. 'Magic knows kids aren't going to stop and listen to
abstinence.' " Id.
239. Although, one may properly state that sex with a condom is "safer" than unpro-
tected sex, the assertion that sex with a condom is "safe" is subject to considerable debate.
Barbara Reynolds, Don't Get the Wrong Message From Magic, USA TODAY, Nov. 15,
1991, at 11A (commenting on safe sex).
Magic as the messenger of safe sex is troubling. First, there might be safer
sex, but there is no such thing as safe sex, either physically or emotionally. In
preventing pregnancy, condoms have a 14% to 20% failure rate. If condoms
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resulted in increased sexual activity, increased pregnancies, and increased
contraction of sexually transmitted diseases among our young.240 The
victims of such inaccuracies, children who look to their instructors for
truth, have suffered a great harm.
Sex education malpractice as a new cause of action may serve to re-
dress such wrongs. Although similar to claims in classical educational
malpractice that have been rejected by the courts, sex education malprac-
tice is uniquely distinguishable. A claim in sex education malpractice is
distinguishable from classical educational malpractice claims because a
legal duty may be clearly and cleanly established. While the science of
pedagogy is fraught with conflicting theories, the sciences of human re-
production and of infectious disease and their transmission are well-
known and share broad consensus within the medical community, thus
providing clear, objective criteria by which to apply a legal duty. A claim
in sex education malpractice is further distinguishable because causation
is not muddled by a myriad of societal factors, but rather focuses upon
whether a student relied upon inaccurate information. Further still, a
claim in sex education malpractice is unique due to its tangible, physical,
and legally compensable injury. Thus, concerns over whether a vague, ill-
defined educational injury exists are immaterial.
Sex education malpractice claims are further distinguishable from past
educational malpractice actions because the public policy considerations
that prompted a rejection of such claims are either inapplicable alto-
gether or wholly unpersuasive. Because the legal issues do not surround
evaluation of educational theories and methods, but rather focus on
clearly defined legal duties, concerns about unnecessary intrusion by the
courts into the educational system are unfounded. Further, because the
remedy is not for an educational injury, but rather for a physical injury,
courts need not meddle in the intricacies of educational remedies. Addi-
tionally, since the social utility of education and reliance upon instruction
are bedrock principles that society should foster, requiring accuracy in
dissemination of such information is critical and therefore worthy of en-
forcement. Lastly, concern over an adverse economic and administrative
impact upon school districts is unpersuasive because the specificity of in-
jury and objective criteria available to define a legal duty effectively filter
feigned claims from potential adjudication. Preclusion of a remedy for
vulnerable children suffering a legally compensable injury directly caused
by a breach of a clearly defined legal duty for reasons of inconvenience
makes a mockery of our system of justice and should be avoided.
aren't so hot at preventing life, how did they become perfect preventing
death?
Id.
240. See DOBSON, supra note 119, at 212 (stating that unwed pregnancies among teens
is up 87%); Yoest Testimony, supra note 120, at E2722 (unwed births are up 61%); EiFnc-
TIVENESS REVIEW, supra note 121, at 339 (more than one million teens get pregnant each
year).
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